Otherism in discourses, integration in policies? by Beauzamy, Brigitte & Féron, Elise
 University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap 
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information. 
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
Author(s): Beauzamy, B. and Féron, E. 
Article Title: Otherism in discourses, integration in policies? 
Year of publication: 2012 
Link to published article : http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10202-011-0028-7 
Publisher statement: Beauzamy, B. and Féron, E. (2012). Otherism in 
discourses, integration in policies? Nordic Journal of Migration 
Research, 2(1), pp. 66-77. 
OTHERISM IN DISCOURSES, INTEGRATION IN POLICIES?
Comparing French and Danish educational policies for migrants
Article • DOI: 10.2478/v10202-011-0028-7 NJMR • 2(1) • 2012 • 066–077
1 CSGR, PAIS, University of Warwick, United Kingdom
2 CARC, University of Kent, United Kingdom
Brigitte Beauzamy1*, Elise Féron2
* E-mail: B.Beauzamy@warwick.ac.uk
Abstract
In this study of educational policies aimed at migrants in France and Denmark, 
we examine how both countries display the same mixture of integration policies 
and of discourses of hostility portraying migrants as scapegoats. Educational 
policies are seen as a fundamental tool to speed up the integration of migrants, 
yet these are seen as a potential threat to national equilibrium and cohesion. 
This contradiction results from specific forms of policy construction and pat-
terns of discursive spaces. This led us to argue, using the Foucauldian concept 
of governmentality, against a unified conception of the power yielded by the 
state on migrants.
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1 Introduction
Comparing France and Denmark with regard to immigration and 
integration issues is rather unusual. France is usually compared with 
Anglo-Saxon countries in order to single out its Republican integra-
tionist specificity as opposed to the forms of multiculturalism present 
in the UK (Byron and Condon 1996; Thierry and Rogers 2004) or 
in the US (Horowitz 1992). On the other hand, Denmark is rarely 
used in comparisons between contrastive cases and is more often 
reintegrated within a general reflection on Nordic or Scandinavian 
countries (Kivinen and Rinne 1998; Nannestad 2004). At first glance, 
France and Denmark have different histories with regard to their 
immigrants and immigration policies, but they also present many 
similarities: both countries have welcomed during the second half of 
the 20th century a large number of first European then non-European 
migrants in order to foster their industrial growth, and both have 
witnessed a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment when the turn towards 
post-industrial economies rendered unqualified migration no longer 
necessary, which materialized in increasingly repressive immigration 
policies. Both countries have experienced political crises related to 
integration issues during the mid-2000s due to two traumatic events: 
the suburban riots in France and the Muhammad drawings con-
troversy in Denmark. These events have prompted fierce debates 
regarding the effects of immigration on insecurity and increasingly 
contentious ethnic relations. Migrants have thus been at the forefront 
of official discourses in both countries, although with quite different 
contents. In France, a Republican discourse on universalism prevails, 
which considers only abstract subjects equal before the law, when 
the Danish discourse is more oriented towards the acknowledgement 
of differences. However, one notices in both cases insistence on the 
goal of integration. Do these differences in the picturing of migrants 
lead to different policies and discourses in the field of education?
In both countries, issues of terminology arise pertaining to 
the very category of “migrant”. According to statistics Denmark, 
“An immigrant is defined as a person born abroad whose parents 
are both (or one of them if there is no available information on the 
other parent) foreign citizens or were both born abroad” (Statistic 
Denmark website, 2011).1 Migrants and ethnic minorities are clearly 
distinguished here: “the former is defined as individuals working in a 
country of which he or she is not a national. It is a term broad enough 
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to capture both regular and irregular foreign workers. (…) [The latter 
comprises] individuals who, while having his or her origins in another 
country, have become citizens of the host country” (ibid.). Yet these 
definitions, while appearing straightforward and based on factual ele-
ments, do not prevent both terms to be used interchangeably in public 
debates. The French context prohibits the use of ethnic categories in 
the compilation of statistics on migrants and their descendents, so 
the main divide is drawn between French and foreigners, based on 
the sole criteria of nationality and citizenship. However, the defini-
tion of ‘immigrant’ retained by the French counterpart to Statistics 
Denmark, the INSEE, blurs this line: ‘an immigrant is a person who 
was born a foreign national in a foreign land and who lives now in 
France’ (INSEE website, 2010).2 Statistics on immigrants therefore 
encompass foreigners but also naturalized French. As in Denmark, 
definitions pertaining to this hotly debated topic appear deceptively 
simplified, and the category of “migrants” is therefore mobilized as 
a factual term used to manage populations, yet it is inherently and 
simultaneously subjected to larger appropriations – for instance in 
the media (Bonnafous 1991). While sticking to official denominations 
in this article, we take stock of this fluidity of meanings that is a key 
element of their multifaceted political uses.
Koopmans et al., in their conceptualization of citizenship in 
Europe, provide a two-dimensional model helping us differentiate 
between the two countries:
On the vertical axis, the continuum runs from conceptions 
of citizenship that favour ethnic bonds as the basis for the 
constitution of the political community to those that emphasize 
equal civic rights and attribute citizenship on the basis of the 
territorial principle. (…) On the horizontal axis, the continuum 
runs from conceptions of citizenship that insist on conformity 
to a single cultural model that is to be shared by all citizens, 
to culturally pluralist conceptions that seek to retain, or even 
stimulate diversity and allow their subjects to follow a variety of 
cultural patterns. (Koopmans et al. 2005: 9–10)
This model helps us to go beyond the somewhat simplistic 
representation of Denmark as a nation relying mainly on an ethnic 
definition of citizenship, while France has usually been presented as 
a good example of a civic regime. As we will see, in fact both coun-
tries have been relying for a long time on ‘cultural monism’ in their 
conception of integration, and France has been gradually moving 
away from pure ‘civic-territorial’ policies aimed at migrants, without 
opting for a full-fledged ‘ethnic’ model. From that perspective, there 
has been a convergence between the policies implemented in both 
countries, rendering their comparison even more interesting.
France and Denmark display the same strange mixture of inte-
gration policies anchored in the history of immigration policies and of 
discourses of hostility and rejection that tend to portray migrants as 
scapegoats. Educational policies are put in the foreground, namely 
in order to speed up the integration of migrants in the national com-
munity. Yet the fact that in both cases migrant subjects are seen as 
a potential threat to national equilibrium and cohesion complicates 
this aim. What we want to explain is this contradiction or this paradox 
that, we argue, is no accident, but the result of specific forms of policy 
construction and of patterns of discursive spaces. This conducts us 
to argue, using the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, against 
a unified conception of the power yielded by the state on migrants: 
even if political discourses identify overarching rationales for policies 
aimed at migrants, such as the fight against unemployment, welfare 
state bankruptcy, or insecurity, in fact policies aiming at different 
objectives and using different instruments coexist. Acknowledging 
this fragmentary, even contradictory nature of educational policies 
aimed at migrants therefore leads us to re-evaluate the critical 
discourses stigmatizing the very real repressive turn of immigra-
tion and integration policies in Europe and hostile policies against 
migrants by arguing that the situation is in fact more complicated 
in both countries. However, in doing so – and in concentrating the 
analysis on the policy side – one is not giving in a unitary, overwhelm-
ing view of the state and its apparatuses. On the contrary, one is 
confronted with multiple sources of power, all of which aim at defin-
ing migrants as their primary target. Even if one does not seek to 
uncover “resistances’, the very concept of ‘power’ is thus challenged 
by acknowledging its multiplicity (Coombe 2007: 285).
2 Integrating the migrants: the shift towards 
an assimilationist perspective
It is striking to see that while France and Denmark have a very different 
history in the longue durée regarding migration, and display diverg-
ing official discourses towards migrants – with a universal stance in 
France and an acknowledgement of differences in Denmark – both 
countries tend to favour an integrationist approach, however, with 
different perspectives: in Denmark, migrants themselves are strongly 
invited to integrate in a voluntary fashion, while in France discourses 
are traditionally formulated as if there were no differences between 
migrants and the rest of the population, and no problems related to 
cultural/ethnic integration at all. In both countries, it is not difficult 
to read an assimilationist subtext in this official position favouring 
integration, which content has evolved along with the shift on how 
immigration was perceived, from economic resource to economic 
burden and sociocultural threat.
2.1 France and immigration3
Despite the recent official tendency to portray France as a country of 
immigration since the 19th century with a long history of dealing with 
the presence and schooling of immigrant children or the children of 
migrants within its National Education System, it has been argued 
that until the 1970s France ignored itself as a country of immigration 
(Noiriel 1988, 1992). Since World War II, France has encouraged and 
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relaxed its national borders at different times, primarily in response to 
its changing economic and demographic need. In the 1950s and the 
1960s, most of the people who migrated to France came from South 
Europe – Spain, Portugal and Italy – to work in French firms which 
lacked workforce. From the mid-1960s on, a new wave of immigrants 
came from the former French colonies of Northern and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, later of Asia. In 1974, the ban on immigration modified radically 
the sociodemographic characteristics of immigrants. Because family 
reunification was one of the few ways left to immigrate in France, the 
migrant population became increasingly female and younger, when 
the families of former ‘migrant workers’ came to join them to live in 
France. Also the countries of origin became increasingly diverse and 
distant (Thierry and Rogers, 2004), with a rise in Asian immigrants 
(INSEE 2005).
France displays both an ancient history of immigration and of 
restrictive immigration policies, as the year 1974 represents a turn 
with the advent of a policy of ‘zero immigration’. In France, as in other 
European Union (EU) countries, the right to immigrate seems to be 
in decline (Wihtol de Wenden 1999) which is mirrored in increasingly 
restrictive immigration policies and legal constraints: the infamous 
‘Pasqua-Méhaignerie laws’ in 1993 and the ‘Debré laws’ have for 
instance created a system of visas and deportation of illegal immi-
grants. Since the termination of legal extra-community immigration, 
in France, except in the two first parts of Mitterrand’s seven-year 
term in office (1981–1986 and 1988–1992), the different govern-
ments – even that of the ‘plural left’ of Lionel Jospin (1998–2002) – all 
assumed a restrictive policy on illegal immigration. This policy is ex-
pressed in procedures increasing the number of people who returned 
to the border, the formulation of different criteria for regularization, 
and a limitation on the rights of individuals to domicile foreigners in 
their homes in France. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
inauguration of the policies referred to as ‘security measures’ during 
the Jospin and Raffarin governments helped to maintain an atmo-
sphere of suspicion towards migrants. These national policies relied 
on European measures such as the increasing cooperation among 
national police forces by means of organizations like Europol. The 
Europeanization process also facilitated the setting up of bilateral 
cooperation agreements with the countries of origin to prevent irregu-
lar entries and to facilitate deportation, like in 2002 with Romania. 
These multiple policies become concrete through increased control 
practices mainly through controlling identities or by closing squats, in 
which homeless illegal or legal migrants reside, and by enforcing an 
intensification of the practice of escorting the rejected to the national 
borders, for which quantitative objectives are now set. This focus on 
managing the population of illegal immigrants and the priority given 
to deportation have materialized as budgetary decisions reallocat-
ing resources and decreasing funding to associations dealing with 
integration assistance for immigrants.
The reference to ‘zero immigration’ has been in place until the 
present day even though some changes in official discourses both at 
the EU and national level seemed to challenge it. In 1999, following a 
meeting of the Ministers of Justice and Interior Affairs in Luxembourg, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom issued a common state-
ment on immigration policies that rejected ‘zero immigration’ and 
‘total freedom of settlement’. In 2002, Nicolas Sarkozy announced 
the necessity to reform the ‘zero immigration’ policy, thereby reopen-
ing the debates on labor immigration, especially for highly qualified 
immigrants who can now apply for the three-year ‘Competencies 
and Talents’ residency permit. However, this shift in discourses at 
the top is hardly visible in migratory flows: professional residency 
permits amounted to 7% of all permits in 2005 compared with 28.2% 
in 1997 when those attributed for family reasons represented 50% of 
all permits in 2005 compared with 31.7% in 1997 (Saint-Paul 2009: 
242). But it can also be argued that such renewal of discourses on 
immigration barely propagated outside the governmental majority.
With regards to integration policies, the French model has 
relied on a specific formula, many have deemed to lead covertly 
to assimilation (Brubaker 2001). For migrants or members of any 
minority, integration in the public space of citizenship meant giving 
up one’s cultural particularities, while they may well be kept alive in 
the private sphere (Jennings 2000: 582). Assimilationist policies may 
well produce unwanted side-effects and indeed reinforce the exclu-
sion of people perceived as alien along ethnic lines even when they 
self-identify as French (Keaton 2005). Despite numerous debates 
surrounding the efficiency and legitimacy of these assimilationist 
policies, France, like Denmark, has recently tried to rationalize and 
centralize its integration policies, especially through the creation in 
2003 of an Inter-ministerial Committee on Integration (CII). At its 
creation, this committee has created an individual ‘Welcome and 
Integration Contract’ (‘Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration’ – CAI), which 
involves reciprocal commitments from the migrant (especially the 
respect of laws and values of the French Republic, and the enrolment 
in civic and if necessary linguistic programs) and the state (espe-
cially the guarantee of individual rights, and the launching of civic 
and linguistic formation programs). Civic and French courses, and 
personalized advices, are totally free. A good knowledge of French 
is a necessary requirement for naturalization and is often seen as 
a good assessment of integration. The CII has also promoted sev-
eral measures in order to favour migrants’ and children of migrants’ 
insertion into the labor market (Capel-Dunn, Rabaud 2004: 25–27). 
However, the media coverage of such measures emphasized as-
pects of the CAI related to the respect of secularism (laïcité) and its 
repressive side was much more discussed than its educational one. 
Similarly, the multiplication of anti-discrimination measures and the 
creation of high profile ad hoc institutions accompanied the creation 
of a ‘Ministry of Immigration, Integration and National Identity’ under 
the Sarkozy administration. Therefore, despite the actual multiplicity 
of orientations characteristic of integration policies, discourses on 
immigration tend to focus on policing migrant population.
The endurance of the ‘zero immigration’ referential and its repres-
sive stance on immigration goes beyond mere path dependency from 
the part of migration policies. Discourses on immigration are also 
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deeply rooted in national traditions which build on the colonial past, 
republicanism and the current perception of a migratory risk in public 
opinion. Immigration became an important political issue only in the 
1970s. Once immigration was built as a social problem in the context 
of the economic crisis and later in the context of the ideological crisis 
of the 1990s which saw a re-evaluation of the Republican dogma in 
favour of a more positive stance on multiculturalism (Wieviorka 1996; 
Amselle 1996), the issue of the integration of migrants and their 
children became a priority for the scientific and political agendas. 
Since the 1990s, new debates on the French nation, in the context of 
globalization and European construction, the worsening of the exclu-
sion of vulnerable people from the labour market, and the increase 
of urban segregation and violence made politicians, researchers, 
and the public more aware of the issue of immigration as such. The 
radical right and especially the Front National parties have been 
very active in shaping the content of these agendas and much of 
their rhetoric has diffused outside their core audience (Beauzamy 
and Naves 2010). Immigrants were turned into scapegoats of un-
employment through the slogan of ‘3 million immigrants in France, 3 
million unemployed people’. Welfare provisions were also said to be 
too generous with migrants, who were accused of taking advantage 
of them. Euroscepticism was also fostered by the accusation that 
European policies favoured illegal immigration from the South and, 
more recently, the East, with a new emphasis on the ‘Roma issue’ 
from the part of President Nicolas Sarkozy in the summer of 2010.
2.2 Denmark and immigration
Contrary to France, Denmark is not a traditional migration country, 
and historically it can even be viewed as a rather homogeneous coun-
try, as far as language, ethnicity, or religion is concerned. However, 
recent decades, especially since the end of the 1960s, have seen a 
sharp increase in the number of people migrating to Denmark. This 
increase might be explained by several factors, like Denmark’s pros-
perity, its lack of manpower, or the slowdown of activity in other more 
traditional migration countries. Since the end of the sixties, Denmark 
has attracted migrants from several countries, like Turkey and former 
Yugoslavia, but also refugees from various war-zones. It must be 
noted that as is the case in France, most of them have a Muslim 
background, even though, contrary to a quite widespread stereotype 
in Danish society, they do not make up a single cultural entity, and do 
not share a common language or origin.
In the eighties and nineties, refugees from all over the world 
thus settled in Denmark; and many refugees and migrants stayed as 
“guest workers”, often occupying jobs that native Danes did not want 
to take. Despite the restriction of the immigration legislation after the 
oil crisis in autumn 1973, which actually led to a complete ban on 
immigration at the end of 1973, the number of immigrants originating 
from countries outside of the European Economic Community , or 
from countries outside the Nordic area, continued to rise, mostly 
because of family reunification and because of a parallel increase 
in the number of refugees asking for asylum in Denmark. The new 
legislations that came into force in 1999 and 2002 have introduced 
geographical quotas for the settling of refugees, who are directed 
towards municipalities with few migrants in order to avoid the ghet-
toization of ethnic minorities in the major cities’ suburbs. The 2002 
reform also introduced restrictions for asylum seekers and refugees, 
and for those migrating for family reunification.
Despite all these restrictions, the share of immigrants in this 
small country of approximately 5.5 million inhabitants has increased 
rapidly over the past decade and is now comparable with that of 
other big European countries. Migrants currently make up 6% of the 
total population, 329,940 people in 2010, of whom 178,425 are from 
‘third countries’. If we also include children of immigrants, who are 
primarily concerned by educational policies, this percentage rises to 
approximately 8.4% of the total population. (MFA 2006: 1). This figure 
is similar to that of France, where migrants made up 5.6% of the total 
population in 2004. The share of ethnic minorities from less devel-
oped countries is constantly increasing, a trend that causes great 
concern, as research has shown that the educational attainment of 
children of immigrants from less developed countries is lower than 
that of native Danes, and as, like in other European countries, the 
integration of ethnic minorities is more difficult when the educational 
attainment is lower; low educational attainment of migrants is also 
blamed for a series of other problems, like high unemployment rates, 
social segregation, etc.
High unemployment rates, coupled with the continuous influx of 
refugees in the eighties, generated popular movements against im-
migration, as well as anti-immigrant and more specifically anti-Muslim 
rhetoric. The Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) popularized 
the idea that Muslim culture and faith was an insurmountable ob-
stacle to integration, and that there was an unavoidable ‘clash of 
culture’ between Islam and Danish culture. The Integration Act of 
1999 embodied both a tougher stance on immigration, and a will 
to ensure the effective integration of those migrants and refugees 
who had already settled in the country. The new legislation made 
family reunification more difficult, curbed social welfare benefits for 
new entrants, and also established local Integration Councils with 
representation of minority ethnic residents of the municipalities, and 
decentralized integration programs. With the landslide victory of the 
Liberals and of the far right Dansk Folkeparti at the 2001 general 
elections, an even more restrictive legislation towards immigration, 
effective since July 2002, was introduced, canceling for instance all 
state funding for mother-tongue education in public schools, and 
several minority or anti-discrimination organizations, and cut down 
allowances for all the new entrants having asylum status. In a move 
that recalls what has been happening for a long time in France, all 
migrants and refugees are now ‘invited’ to concentrate on learning 
Danish language, to refrain from using their native tongue in the pub-
lic sphere, and to adopt Danish values and culture (Hussain 2002: 7). 
Since 2010, Denmark has further tightened its immigration rules via 
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a points system, reflecting the perceived desirability of immigrants. 
Importantly, migrants can accumulate points based on language 
skills, education or work experience.
In Denmark, the first national integration policies were designed 
in 1983, with the publication of a ‘Memorandum on Migration Policy’ 
by the Danish government (Bjerg Petersen 2004: 7). According to 
these guidelines, until 1999 it was mainly the central state that regu-
lated integration policies (which were in turn mainly implemented by 
the counties), with the general goal of equality between immigrants, 
refugees and native Danes, a goal that did not entail the setting up of 
any specific institution (Hvenegård-Lassen 2005: 6). However, with 
the arrival of a massive number of refugees in the eighties and in the 
nineties, changes were progressively introduced. For instance, the 
Danish Refugee Council offered integration courses to refugees in 
order to facilitate their integration and participation in the Danish so-
ciety, and, even more importantly, municipalities began to formulate 
their own local integration policies.
These changes were recorded in the reform of immigration 
legislation in 1999, which states that it is the local authorities – the 
municipalities – that are responsible both for the setting up and for the 
implementation of policies designed in order to favour the integration 
of adult immigrants. Integration courses previously restricted to refu-
gees have been extended to all newcomers from non-EU countries; 
this mandatory ‘introduction program’ can last up to three years, and 
includes Danish language courses, civic formation, courses on the 
Danish society and culture, and job training. These Danish language 
courses are free for foreigners over the age of 18 who are officially 
registered as residents of a municipality. The diploma delivered after 
the completion of the language course is compulsory to get Danish 
citizenship.4 The design of these courses is in line with the growing 
awareness of national and local authorities since the middle of the 
eighties regarding language proficiency as a means to avoid isolation 
of migrants, favour their insertion in the labor market, and generally 
allow for their genuine integration. This concern was embodied in 
the passing in 1986 of the first law on teaching Danish language for 
migrants, which was revised in 1994, and then replaced by more far 
reaching and encompassing laws in 1998 and 2003. The main inno-
vation of the 2003 Act on “Danish education for adult foreigners and 
others” is to strengthen the connection between language courses 
and employment (Bjerg Petersen 2004: 10). The link between lan-
guage learning and access to employment, which was up to then 
implicit, thus became explicit and central.
Concretely speaking, the responsibility for teaching Danish as 
a second language is placed in about 65 language centers located 
in all regions of Denmark, which are organized as schools and are 
officially recognized by the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and 
Integration Affairs. The Ministry provides them with pedagogical 
guidelines, and their curricula and final language examinations are 
nationally standardized. They are also directly linked to municipalities 
that supervise their activities, and to private companies and labor 
market organizations, in order to favour the insertion of migrants into 
the labor market. In 2003, more than 45,000 adult migrants attended 
these language centers for between 340 and 2000 hours of teaching, 
according to their educational background (Bjerg Petersen 2004: 11). 
According to his/her educational level, each adult migrant is allocated 
to a Danish course and to a module. He/she has to develop an indi-
vidual language learning plan. This individual plan has to be in line 
with his/her individual integration plan, which has been designed by 
the migrant, in collaboration with the social services in the municipal-
ity where he/she has settled.
Both France and Denmark have thus placed integration at the 
center of their immigration policies, in a context where the arrival of 
new migrants was generally portrayed as an issue to be tackled with 
repressive measures. Therefore the enabling aspects of integration 
have progressively given way to the setting of instruments aimed at 
policing the migrants’ will to integrate in which cultural integration 
serves as a proxy to assimilation. In the next section, we will examine 
how educational policies aimed at migrants conjugate the goal of 
maximizing their contribution to the national economy and especially 
the labor market with this assimilationist stance.
3 Educational policies aimed at migrants: 
disparate and contested instruments to 
foster ‘integration’
3.1 Integration policies in France: producing citizens as 
a primary goal
The demographic changes affecting immigration flows have had a 
strong impact on migrant children or children with a migrant back-
ground who were increasingly numerous in the French education 
system, since migrant children have the same rights and obligations 
to attend school as the French children, no matter their legal status. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, foreign children accounted for 9.4% of 
all children in elementary school in France, compared with 7.7% in 
the mid-1970s. The rise in the rate of foreign children at school until 
the mid-1980s resulted from the policy of family reunification. Almost 
all the foreign children attend public schools. Immigrant families tend 
to have a lower income; besides, adaptation classes for children who 
do not speak French well are for the most part available in public 
schools. The number of foreign students in high schools has been 
steadily rising since 1975. This increase results from the lengthen-
ing of studies, apart from the consequences of family reunification, 
but it is now almost stabilized. There were 137,000 foreign students 
registered in French universities at the beginning of the 1990s, which 
amounts to 11.2% of the total student population.
The French school is therefore highly open to children of 
migrants, insofar as equal opportunities remain the rule. As a 
consequence, the French schooling system is, in principle, indif-
ferent to differences, and it is this egalitarian and secular attitude 
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that constitutes the means through which a direct link is created 
between each individual, called upon to be a citizen, and the political 
community to which he or she belongs, namely the French nation. 
However, this model has been widely criticized following the seminal 
critique of Bourdieu and Passeron (1970), which shed light on how 
the schooling system, by giving in to the reproduction of the ‘culture 
bourgeoise’, de facto discriminated against children of low-income 
families. This led to a growing awareness of the discrimination 
against children of migrants for the past twenty years. But despite 
these critics and numerous educational reforms to improve the over-
all achievement of pupils, assessment procedures in the educational 
system have not changed much: they still unwillingly favour French 
native pupils. Language competence is highly important in decisions 
regarding migrant students, since pupils are strictly assessed on 
their abilities to speak, write and understand French language. As 
a consequence, the education of non-francophone children who ar-
rive in France with no prior schooling constitutes a main challenge 
for National Education that strives at integrating them successfully. 
This challenge has been met by displaying additional resources to 
schools located in poor neighborhoods instead of addressing the 
specific difficulties met by children of migrant origin in the French 
public school system. Today, educational inequalities related to lan-
guage acquisition, socioeconomic disadvantage and discrimination, 
and the problems these pose for the learner, the class, the educators 
and the schooling system, continue to be addressed within these 
broadly defined blanket policies. Sensitive Schools created in 1993 
and Priority Educational Networks (REP) in 1997 continue to define 
priority education in terms of target sites where the population is 
most at risk for schooling difficulties, failure or dropout, as well as 
violence, deviance and delinquency. Many of the schools that fall 
within priority education areas or networks cater to an overly high 
proportion of immigrant children and French children of immigrant 
descent. However, paradoxically the failure to recognize the ‘minor-
ity’ status of these populations, while simultaneously deploying 
educational resources to improve their schooling outcomes, means 
that individuals continue to be exposed to implicit forms of discrimina-
tion (segregation, ethnicization and stigmatization) that interact with 
educational outcomes without these factors being taken into account 
in official policy discourses.
As far as legal aspects are concerned, discrimination in education 
in France has received relatively less attention than discrimination 
in labor. This may in part be attributed to the ideological premises 
upon which National Education in France was founded – uniform 
(universal), equal and secular education for all children – and the 
concurrent denial or repression of any and all references to differ-
ential treatment, be it in the interest of eradicating discrimination or 
inequalities, on the basis of ‘racial’, ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ or ‘national’ 
origins. In the 1980s, the Ministry of National Education has adopted 
a policy of positive discrimination in favour of priority areas, in order 
to reduce the impact of social inequality on educational achievement. 
Educational Priority Areas (ZEP) were created in 1981 for the benefit 
of all pupils – schooled in primary, junior high and senior (mainstream 
and vocational) high schools – living in socioeconomically and 
culturally disadvantaged environments. Schools zoned as priority 
education areas are allotted additional staff, teaching and financial 
resources, intended to reinforce existing educational activities and 
facilitate the implementation of innovative locally based initiatives. 
The Republican injunction regarding the provision for differential 
treatment on the basis of ‘ethnic’ or other origins meant that the policy 
had to be formulated in general terms as addressing the educational 
needs or difficulties of all children whose disadvantaged social, eco-
nomic or ‘cultural’ situation hinders their achievement or integration 
within the schooling system. All this makes the success of immigrants 
difficult in French school. Private education (in fact largely sponsored 
by the state) is often a solution sought by better-off immigrant parents 
wanting to avoid the problems (including inequalities and discrimina-
tion) encountered in certain disqualified inner-city public schools. 
Moreover, since a number of private schools are in fact affiliated to a 
religious body (dispensing secular and religious education), the lack 
of Muslim private schools, as compared with the historical presence 
of Catholic and Jewish schools raises another issue.
Therefore, despite the strong meritocratic credo at the heart of 
the Republican ideology, the educational system is in fact relatively 
closed to pupils of migrant origin because, far from the ideal which 
portrayed the school as a haven of equality within an unequal so-
ciety, removed from the social, economic, political and ethno-racial 
tensions that traverse society, the school has become increasingly 
permeable to these tensions and problems. Religion has become 
a problematic issue with the politicization of the ‘headscarf affairs’ 
since the late 1980s, which erupted when middle school students 
refused to take off their Muslim veil. Even though this issue actually 
concerned a very limited number of pupils, it became a new symbolic 
center of discourses on the education of migrants by emphasizing the 
apparent incompatibility between the Republican education system 
and migrant cultures reproduced even by second or third genera-
tion migrants. The headscarf affairs tended to construct a symbolic 
opposition between Republican ideals and policies, secularism and 
gender equality on the one hand and tradition, immigration of dubi-
ous legality, and obscurantism on the other hand. The educational 
system and its treatment of migrant pupils are thus evaluated accord-
ing to two different and in fact contradictory standards: on the one 
hand, equality and meritocracy remain the rule, in a context marked 
since the 1980s by an overarching objective of improving the overall 
performance of French pupils and students. On the other hand, the 
school is asked to perform special integrative tasks towards migrant 
children and to contribute to their knowledge and acceptance of the 
French history and culture – actually to their cultural assimilation. 
School education is considered to be the primary mechanism for the 
transmission of Republican symbols (the flag, the national anthem) 
and values: “The Republican culture which must be known and un-
derstood by new immigrants so that they can adapt to and integrate 
in a new society is based on norms and values shared by the citizens 
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and which constitutes a common civic patrimony” (Haut Conseil à 
l’Intégration 2009: 20). This aim is complicated by the fact that little 
consensus exists on the content of this cultural or civilizational aspect 
of the curricula: the controversies surrounding the 2005 draft5 which 
recommended that the “positive aspects of colonization” be taught at 
school, or the difficulty to implement a multicultural orientation to the 
teaching of the history of religions, reveal that the French education 
system is required to perform much more with migrant children than 
helping them gain the qualifications they will need for their integration 
in the labor market.
3.2 Integration policies in Denmark: language and 
employment as central concerns
As is the case in France, the Danish educational system is mainly 
public, with more than 87% children attending public schools, and 
private schools largely subsidized by the state. Among factors 
facilitating educational attainment of immigrants, one can note the 
fact that the public educational system is almost totally free – no 
tuition fees and free school books from basic school to university 
level – and, as stated above, the setting up of free mother-tongue 
language courses in nearly all municipalities. All ethnic or religious 
groups may also found private schools under the private independent 
school legislation. These schools receive about 75% of their funding 
from public sources. For instance, during the 2004/2005 academic 
year there were 21 private independent basic schools mainly or 
exclusively for bilingual pupils, but this figure also includes private 
independent basic schools for pupils speaking languages such as 
English and German (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2006: 
2). However, state policies regarding bilingualism have become 
tougher these last years, with a general assimilationist policy, 
particularly after the election of a right-wing government in 2001, 
which abolished mother-tongue teaching of minority languages in 
public schools, seen as a threat to the survival of Danish language 
and culture. Prior to this abolition, children of migrants were offered 
instruction in the national language of their country of origin three to 
five hours a week, but outside ordinary school hours, for example, on 
Saturdays (Jørgensen 2003: 75).
The Danish educational system has been facing a strong pres-
sure since the massive arrival of migrants in the seventies and 
eighties. Educational policies, which in other traditional migration 
countries have taken decades if not centuries to evolve, here have 
undergone rapid changes in no more than two decades. These 
changes are linked to rapidly evolving representations of the place 
migrants and children of migrants could occupy in Danish society. 
The idea of a possible rapid assimilation of migrants into the 
society was thus progressively replaced by the need to educate 
them so that they can integrate easily into the labor market: “In 
the United States, ‘assimilation’ was the goal from 1900 to 1925, 
followed by ‘adjustment’ from 1925 to 1954, ‘access’ from 1954 
to 1983, and ‘achievement’ from 1983 to the present. Placed in 
historical perspective, the Danish system has followed a similar 
pattern in a much shorter period of time” (Planck Johnson 2003: 
169). Nowadays, in its integration policy, the Danish govern-
ment puts the stress on the role of familial environment in the 
educational attainment of children. Parents’ responsibility as 
child raisers is stressed, and the need for them to cooperate with 
schools. One of the key elements of this policy is to begin the 
‘integration work’ at pre-school age, and implement it throughout 
the whole educational curriculum. Children whose mother tongue 
is not Danish can follow day-care offers and language stimulation 
from the age of 3 or 4 (MRI 2005: 2). Such provisions are even 
likely to be made compulsory in the future and the establishment 
of mentors/adult friends as homework coaches (DG 2003: 12). 
Therefore, if bilingualism is not really fought by the state, as it still 
founds bilingual private schools, it must be noted that the stress is 
put first and foremost on the learning of Danish language. Another 
characteristic of this policy is the stress that is put on the aim of 
insertion into the labor market. In other words, the fact that a par-
ent’s child were migrants or refugees, or that the child arrived as 
a baby in Denmark should not hamper his/her later employment. 
Both linguistic capacities and practical qualifications and training 
of children of migrants receive specific attention, with a focus on 
practical training places and apprenticeships. For those young 
people aged 18–25 years, among whom a majority of children of 
migrants, who did not complete any job-qualifying diploma, and 
who need a cash assistance, the Danish government has even 
made it compulsory to commence a “relevant job-qualifying 
course” (MRII 2005: 2). In this field of vocational or professional 
training, parents are again invited to involve themselves better and 
more thoroughly, if they want to keep their allowance.6
Danish integration policies thus underwent extremely rapid 
changes, from a stress on integration via the labor market, to as-
similation as measured by cultural criteria, among which linguistic 
skills. It is therefore not surprising that the Danish government has 
recently been willing to further the integration of some categories 
of migrants displaying specific characteristics such as a high 
educational attainment, and that educational policies have been 
put at the centre of the integration plans. The ‘loyalty’ of children of 
migrants is now measured thanks to their linguistic skills, but also 
thanks to their ability to adopt Danish values as transmitted in the 
schooling system. While the stress is put on the ‘burden’ of bilin-
gualism, migrant families face an increasing pressure to enforce 
the ‘Danicization’ of their children, by favoring their educational 
attainment, and by ensuring that they learn to be good, loyal and 
law-abiding citizens. In short, because of the growing awareness 
of the fact that the schooling system alone cannot produce integra-
tion and that wider social networks play an important role in this 
process, children of migrants are invited to adopt a cultural and 
social world that ignores or even depreciates their familial origins.
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3.3 Do integration policies in both countries 
mirror the turn from an assimilationist stance to an 
exclusionary project?
We find that integration policies in both France and Denmark pursue 
multiple aims simultaneously. This can be explained by the geneal-
ogy of these policies: they were initially designed to help integrating 
migrants socioeconomically into the host society, illustrating the 
Foucauldian analysis of governmentality as the historical develop-
ment of policy instruments which take the national economy and 
wealth as their primary aims (Foucault 2001: 655–659). However, the 
repressive turn taken by integration policies reveals a shift from this 
governmentality perspective. Migrants are no longer policed in order 
to be incorporated in the national economy (although in a subaltern 
position); they are treated as potential threats to the nation-state. 
Therefore, integration policies also aim at preventing migrants from 
being a menace to the national culture or civilization by ensuring that 
they adhere to certain cultural traits, to which the national language 
acts as a proxy. Other collective values are thus included in this 
cultural assimilation project, such as Republicanism in France, the 
universal welfare state in Denmark. The construction of an ‘Other’ 
to these civilizational traits entails an exclusionary aspect to national 
educational projects.
This civilizational content of educational policies is not new and 
we might be witnessing a return to the project of using education 
as “a means of cultivating sections of the nation with limited cultural 
capital towards greater nobility, and of enhancing the moral and cul-
tural value of each individual.” (Kivinen and Rinne 1998: 41). Such 
a project is similar to what was witnessed in France under the III 
Republic (1870–1940). Under this regime, the schooling system was 
granted a civilizational mission, that of training ‘good’ citizens, sharing 
a number of cultural traits such as the use of the French language, 
but also adhering to key cultural values, such as Republicanism or 
laïcité (Deloye 1994).
This last remark brings us to re-examine what appears at 
first glance to be a fragmentation of educational policies aimed at 
migrants in the light of an institutional or state-building perspective. 
Both in France and in Denmark, educational policies have histori-
cally been used as a way to reinforce the state by means of crafting 
law-abiding citizens (Kivinen and Rinne 1998: 44–45). This explains 
why in both countries we witness an overwhelming dominance of 
the public schooling system and a state monopoly over key aspects 
such as the delivery of diplomas and the fixation of curricula, which 
are managed by centralized bureaucracies. Incorporating new 
subjects in increasingly varied educational facilities and developing 
new policy instruments addressing the “migrant pupil issue” acts as 
a way to reinforce these institutions. Yet the multiple aims assigned 
to these instruments seized by a variety of actors – teachers, social 
workers, the police, etc. – contribute to the multiplicity of the sources 
and forms of power imbued in policies, thereby reinforcing their “as-
semblage” structure – that is, the opposite of a monolithic conception 
of institutions (Coombe 2007: 284) – which allows a loud repressive 
discourse on migrants while continuing to integrate them in the 
labor market. In the last section, we will focus on how discourses 
critical of the achievements of educational policies may fit within this 
Otherism paradigm.
4 Educating the ‘disintegrated’:  
an impossible goal to achieve?
4.1 In France: an assimilated ‘universal’ subject?
The French schooling system is today faced with having to address 
the increased ethnicization of the difficulties associated with school-
ing migrants and children of migrants and the implications that this 
has for school relations (among teachers and pupils, teachers and 
parents, pupils of different ‘ethnic’ origins) and discrimination in 
education (segregation, orientation practices). At the same time, the 
increased politicization of ethnic identities within schools and in pub-
lic discourse creates a double bind for educators and policy makers 
who cannot respond effectively to these issues without compromis-
ing on the basic principles of equal, secular Republican education. 
The Republican taboo on ethnic, religious, or cultural origins blinds 
the schooling system to an ever-widening gap between the principles 
underpinning National Education – equality, tolerance, non-discrimi-
nation on the basis of group differences – and the ordinary practices 
which take place daily within its ‘jurisdiction’. Moreover, this taboo 
prevents the institution and its professionals from conceptualizing 
and addressing the question of discrimination as it takes place in 
education and within the school. Yet it does not limit the multiplication 
of discourses claiming to unveil this taboo issue or point to the “state 
of denial” in which French policymakers are concerning migrants’ 
educational achievements (Lagrange 2010).
Far from obfuscating the uncomfortable truth, studies on immi-
grants in Europe have already demonstrated that pupils and students 
with a migrant background tend to underperform in France (Withol 
de Wenden 1999). Several indicators show it: foreign students are 
clearly overrepresented in adaptation classes for people who do not 
finish the first cycle of high school and are oriented in professional 
classes and vocational training. In the second cycle of high school, 
they are also more likely to attend professional classes than general 
or technical classes. Foreigners living in France tend to have far 
fewer diplomas than French people. In 1990, 60% of all foreigners 
declared that they did not have any diploma, compared with only 
27% of French citizens by birth. Immigrants fare generally worse 
as compared with native pupils because most of them belong to 
low-educated and low-income families. If these facts are publicized, 
the explanations given to them by most political actors – politicians 
and policymakers, NGOs and public intellectuals – however, deny 
that the migrant origin of pupils might be at fault. Contrary to the 
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Danish case, and because of the Republican disregard for ethnic, re-
ligious, or cultural distinctions, official discourses mainly put forward 
socioeconomic explanations in order to explain the low educational 
attainment of migrants and children of migrants because they come 
from low-income families, and are victims of residential segregation, 
their chances to complete successfully the basic school programs 
are significantly lower. When migrant cultures are evoked, it is in 
their utmost ‘traditional’ and anti-modern aspects. These official 
discourses, far from re-valorizing migrants’ identities, in fact further 
exclude and stigmatize them, either because they seem to ignore 
their existence or because they point at practices extremely at odds 
with the principles of National Education – such as asking the exemp-
tion of girls from certain classes for modesty purposes – which in fact 
concern only a very small portion of pupils of migrant origin.
Discourses on immigrants constructed through and in the media 
over the past dozen years in France have clearly singled out children 
of North African origin as the most prone to involvement in acts of 
violence, delinquency or drug-related behavior, not to mention school 
drop-out, truancy, and disciplinary action, and more recently gang 
rape. Such negative stereotyping now seems to have transferred 
to Black youth of Sub-Saharan origin, whose failure in the school 
system is often blamed on their parents’ polygamy practices. This 
negative media coverage significantly contributes to their continued 
stigmatization, exclusion and vulnerability to discrimination. In many 
societal spheres and increasingly in the media, explanations for the 
low educational attainment of migrants that are linked to their cultural 
background are often quoted, such as the size of migrant families, 
or their ‘unwillingness’ to integrate. Moreover, the media consistently 
depicts these youth as foreigners, when in fact they are either French 
citizens (by virtue of being born in France), or will become French 
citizens automatically upon reaching legal maturity – 18 years of 
age – or have the right to claim French citizenship between the ages 
of 16 and 21 years. In so doing, these rhetorical strategies legitimate 
and re-create the exclusion and discrimination that these youngsters 
experience in their daily lives. Equally important, they perpetuate an 
ideology that blames the disqualified individual and group for its so-
cioeconomic, educational and political disadvantage, and undermine 
the effectiveness of the so-called positive discrimination strategies 
adopted in education over the past two decades.
It is therefore possible to track changes in the explanations to 
migrant pupils’ underperformances, which reveal the composite 
nature of educational integration policies. Socioeconomic analyses 
have consistently pointed at the need for more resources, especially 
in areas where disadvantaged pupils are concentrated. Yet argu-
ments putting forward practices of discrimination have contributed to 
the critique of this color-blind argument and asked that educational 
institutions examine their own bias – intended or not – towards mi-
grant pupils. The prevalence of a paradigm of Otherism has led to 
an increasing tendency to blame migrant cultures for these issues: 
the ethno-racial (and gendered) categorization of pupils between the 
‘integrated’ and the ‘disintegrated’ constructs this latter category of 
hopeless troublemakers. Therefore, discourses blaming the failure of 
existing educational policies aimed at migrants may actually fit within 
a paradigm in which they are not expected to succeed, since their 
shortcomings help reinforce exclusionary practices against migrants.
4.2 In Denmark: insertion into the labor market or as-
similation?
In Denmark, while the future insertion of children into the labor mar-
ket is understandably put at the forefront of educational policies, it is 
striking that this goal often hardly differentiates itself from the one of 
assimilation: “The Danes educate Denmark’s immigrant population 
admirably, with one exception: to them, Danish culture is the ultimate 
goal of citizenship” (Planck Johnson 2003: 169). This goal derives 
from the perception that Danish culture, albeit unified and stable, is 
vulnerable and threatened by outside influences such as migrants’ 
cultures and values. In this siege mentality, educational policies 
serve as one of the means to preserve Danish culture, by teaching 
it to all children inhabiting the country. Low educational achievement 
of migrants is therefore considered as a threat to the preservation of 
national identity.
As Kirsten Hvenegård has shown in her Danish-Swedish com-
parative study (2005), integration is not an easy goal, because it 
entails several criteria. In the societal language, integration mostly 
relates to the assimilation of Danish culture and values, and to the 
building of a network of ‘native Danes’ relationships. In the language 
of policies, this assimilation of migrants and children of migrants is 
mediated by more pragmatic goals, such as linguistic competence 
or employment, this latter criteria being tightly linked to the former. 
Thus importance is given to educational attainment of migrants and 
their children. Assessments and evaluations of this achievement 
have greatly evolved; while migrants themselves have long been 
thought responsible for their own low educational attainment, and 
also for their high unemployment rates, the role of the society in 
perpetuating discrimination, and administrative failures, have slowly 
come to be accused too, and have led to the above mentioned policy 
changes. But when these changes did not bring the awaited results, 
explanations linked to the migrants’ own behavior, or to their familial 
environment, have come back to the fore.
Indeed, contrary to native Danes, all young immigrants do not com-
plete the basic school program, as many of them are already grown 
up when they actually settle in Denmark. And compared with the 
native Danes, their level of educational attainment is still consider-
ably low, whether they are first- or generation immigrants, even if 
there are significant differences according to the country they come 
from.7 Among the reasons explaining this low educational attainment, 
researchers point mainly to language problems, low level of parental 
education, or the fact that many of them marry at a very young age 
(Jakobsen, Smith 2003). In many official publications, however, 
bilingualism itself is considered as a burden and is quoted as a main 
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reason for low educational attainment of children of immigrants, with 
more than 9% of pupils in primary and secondary schools being 
bilingual (DG 2003: 11–12). More often than not, the mother tongue 
of migrants and their children is also depicted as primitive, not ‘use-
ful’, by opposition to more ‘modern’ languages, a category to which 
Danish obviously belongs (Jørgensen 2003: 76). In other words, in 
official discourses, it is mainly the cultural background – mainly the 
type of family and bilingualism – of migrants or children of migrants 
that is deemed responsible for their low educational attainment, and 
not the potential inadequacy of policies. These poor educational 
results in turn explain their failed assimilation, and migrants are seen 
as responsible for their fate.
In the media though, the stress is increasingly put on the mi-
grants’ unwillingness to integrate and on their wish to profit from the 
system (especially the welfare state), without actually contributing to 
it by entering the workforce, or for children of migrants, by acquiring 
the necessary qualifications (among which, linguistic skills) for doing 
so. As a consequence, the pressure on the education system is very 
heavy, and the children of migrants are victim of a ‘push and pull’ fac-
tor: they face an injunction to assimilate, but at the same time even 
when their educational attainment is good, they often feel rejected 
because of racism and are suspected of not being loyal and abusing 
the system. As is the case in France, in the media they are portrayed 
as trouble-makers, prone to violence or delinquency, and unwilling 
to be ‘good citizens’. They embody this ‘cultural other’ whose inner 
characteristics prevent their integration. As such, children of migrants 
might be fighting a losing battle.
5 Conclusion
In Denmark as in France, we see that despite all educational policies 
and programs that were set up in the last few decades, migrants are 
at the core of several controversies, public debates and discourses 
about education and are often portrayed as a threat to ‘cultural 
homogeneity’. They are therefore urged to integrate, and in the 
absence of such assimilation, they are seen as an economic burden 
and as a security threat. In France, the official refusal to consider 
migrants’ origins not only hampers the setting up of appropriate 
educational policies, but also makes the fight against racism and 
discrimination more difficult in a context where discourses blaming 
migrants’ backward cultures thrive. In Denmark, the recent and 
tougher stance on immigration and integration, displayed both at 
official and civil society levels, increasingly puts the responsibility for 
educational achievement and integration on the shoulders of migrants 
themselves. However, we see that in spite of diverging ideologies 
regarding the management of cultural diversity, both countries have 
come to adopt a similar goal – with language learning as a central 
lever – that is, cultural assimilation as opposed to the socioeconomic 
or even political one.
The concept of governmentality is useful to understand the 
paradoxes and contradictions of educational policies embedded 
within discursive spaces which increasingly rely on Otherism. It has 
been increasingly explored to analyze the complex arrangements 
characteristic of contemporary governance (Burchell et al. 1991; 
Dean 1999), be it multi-level governance (as in both our European 
cases) or burgeoning public-private partnerships. Yet the wide uses 
of the concept may lead to the dissolution of its explicative capacity 
(Coombe 2007: 284). Governmentality puts the emphasis on govern-
ment techniques, with the population being the main object for policy. 
In our cases it materializes in the wide use of quantitative tools to 
evaluate public policies and especially educational achievements. 
However, such tools are inherently at fault either because of ideo-
logical limitations on the dimensions being monitored like in France 
or because their avowed aim to evaluate the future socioeconomic 
integration of migrant pupils does not match the real objective to 
warn against dangers threatening the countries.
However, we are reminded that governmentality stretches both 
inside and outside the state (Foucault 2001: 656): what may be 
governed is not determined solely by the state but also in a relative 
consensus with civil society or public opinion. For instance, the fram-
ing of migrants as a potential threat to the nation (national identity, 
good governance, security, etc.) derives not only from repressive 
public policies but also from the coexistence of integrationist policies 
with exclusionary discourses. In France, it materializes in contradic-
tions between the contemporary policy discourse treating migrants 
as an economic asset and the prevalence of discursive strategies 
portraying them as unassimilable. In Denmark, similar contradictions 
may be identified between educational policies aimed at developing 
migrants’ social capital and their depiction as burdens to the welfare 
state. Here the concept of assemblage is useful, since it helps con-
ceptualizing the limits of governmentality.
Does the prevalence of negative evaluations of education poli-
cies aimed at migrants point towards a failure of this assemblage? It 
is an object of constant public debate, and even politicians who are 
or have been members of the Danish and French governments are 
keen on emphasizing the failure of the schooling systems to integrate 
migrants. We argue that such critical discourse is more related to 
Otherism than to a project to reform educational policies. The stress 
put on migrant pupils’ low educational attainment mainly points to the 
majority’s achievement and children of migrants can almost be con-
sidered as scapegoats in a time of crisis. As shown by René Girard, 
scapegoats have always been used in order to reinforce the group’s 
sense of unity, they are arbitrary victims in the sense that they are not 
directly responsible for the problems that the community faces, but 
they usually share similar cultural traits that place them on the border 
of the community (Girard 1986). Would governmentality ultimately 
be possible without this conceptualization of potential “enemies from 
within? The goals that are set for educational policies are not likely 
to be met, and indeed it looks like children of migrants are used as a 
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benchmark in educational policies: pointing at their low educational 
attainment serves to comfort the others about their own achieve-
ments, especially in a period of ‘crisis’. We might even go further and 
suggest that these educational goals are not all meant to be reached 
in the case of children of migrants. The categorization at the heart of 
governmentality practices (Christie and Sidhu, 2006: 455) allows to 
differentiate between excluded and integrated migrants, and the ap-
parent universality of the schooling system provides an institutional 
sanction to these representations.
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Notes
1 http://www.dst.dk/HomeUK/Statistics/focus_on/focus_on_
show.aspx?sci=565
2 http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/
immigre.htm
3 Data on the French case borrowed from an updated version 
of a country-case study carried out within the framework of the 
comparative European Union funded FP5 « XENOPHOB » proj-
ect, directed by Professor Tom Burns and Professor Masoud 
Kamali (University of Uppsala, Sweden): Beauzamy Brigitte 
and Saad Tazi, “Discriminatory landscape in the institutional 
areas in France” (Deliverable 1, 2003) and Beauzamy Brigitte 
and Marie-Cécile Naves, “Patterns of discrimination in France: 
school and the labour market” (Deliverable 4, 2004).
4 Since November 2010, all migrants applying for a residence 
permit on the grounds of family reunification are also to pass an 
“immigration test”, including a language test for testing Danish 
language skills and a knowledge test testing the migrant’s 
knowledge about Denmark, Danish society, but also Danish 
norms, values and fundamental rights, such as the principles 
of democracy, gender equality and freedom of expression and 
religion.
5 The draft as a whole addressed the issue of the official treat-
ment of the French repatriated to France after the end of the 
Algeria war.
6 The reasoning also applies to young offenders: “The individual 
family is also responsible for keeping their children out of crime. 
The government will strengthen parental responsibility by 
offering parents who do not support their children’s education 
or follow up if their children commit crime that they can attend 
programmes intended to teach them to understand and accept 
their responsibility. If they fail to observe specific orders, it will 
be possible to reduce their family allowance” (MRII 2005: 4).
7 For instance, according to Jakobsen and Smith (2003: 16), 
Pakistani young immigrants fare a lot better at university level 
than do Turkish young immigrants.
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